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INTRODUCTION 
The eurocurrency market is a market for intermediated funds where 
eurobanks acting as intermediaries, place themselves between the 
depositors of funds and the ultimate users of those funds. Like most 
financial markets, the eurocurrency market has a credit and a deposit side. 
There are two aspects to the deposit side of the eurocurrency market, 
which is the subject matter of this article: ( 1) the market dealing primarily 
with the deposit of short-term funds by depositors and the lending of those 
funds to the final users or borrowers, and (2) the market dealing with the 
interbank placement of funds where commercial banks borrow, lend, or 
trade eurocurrency among themselves. The operation of the eurocurrency 
market gives rise to legal relationships between eurobanks, their customers 
and other intermediary banks that may be different from the traditional 
banker-customer relationship. This article discusses the nature and 
operation of the eurocurrency market and how the legal consequences of 
the eurobank customer relationship are different from the domestic 
banker-customer relationship. It argues that there is a need for a 
redefinition of the common law on the banker-customer relationship. 
I. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT OPERATION 
Eurocurrency deposit operations involve the placing and taking of 
deposits. The transactions are essentially loan transactions. The owners of 
the funds place the funds in banks or lend these funds while the depository 
banks take or accept the funds thus placed with them. A typical 
eurocurrency deposit1 operation will therefore usually involve four groups 
*Barrister, Solicitor & Lecturer in International Financial Law & Regulation, Faculty of 
Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. 
1. Although one reference is usually made to the eurocurrency deposit, from the legal 
point of view, there are two aspects of the transaction. The transaction is broken down into 
(1) the traditional deposit arrangement and (2) a separate loan transaction. The separate 
loan transaction is between the depositor as the lender of the funds and the bank as the 
borrower. The loan agreement will specify certain terms including (1) the currency; (2) the 
place of payment; (3) the duration of the deposit; (4) the rates of interest; and (5) the 
currency and place of repayment. See D. Urech, Elements of Contractual Law in 
Euromoney Dealings, 1 J. INT'L BANKING LAW 14 (1998), available at 2004 WL UK-JLR 
4644056; D. CARREAU, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
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of participants: the original depositors, who in relation to the bank, are also 
lenders of the funds; the depository banks; other intermediary banks in the 
interbank market; and the final users of the funds. 2 
A. The Depositors 
It is possible to group the initial depositors of eurocurrency funds into 
three categories: official institutions such as government and quasi-
government bodies, central banks and other depositors of funds, which are 
neither government nor financial institutions. This latter group includes 
international corporations and individuals. 3 These initial depositors of 
funds enter the market in a number of ways and for a variety of reasons. 
Official institutions such as governments, government bodies and central 
banks may enter the market directly as suppliers of funds when they 
deposit a portion of their national reserves of a particular currency in 
eurobanks. The rationale for entering the market in this manner could 
include the desire to earn higher yields than would be possible in their own 
commercial banks. 
Central banks may also supply funds indirectly through the use of 
swap arrangements. In this case, the central banks will sell foreign 
currency to their national commercial banks with the understanding that 
the concerned commercial banks will use those funds to procure foreign 
currency assets, reduce their liabilities and finance international trade. The 
central banks will then repurchase the currency at a later date. In most 
cases where such swap arrangements are used, the rationale is to further 
national monetary policy by controlling domestic monetary conditions and 
short-term capital flows. 
Commercial banks constitute the institutional core of the 
eurocurrency market. Although primarily concerned with their role as 
intermediaries, commercial banks, nevertheless, contribute to the supply of 
eurocurrency. They may purchase foreign currency and then place these 
funds in the market, or they may use such funds to finance the 
DEPOSIT CONTRACTS 147 (Hans Smit, et al. eds., Matthew Bender 1981); and PAUL EINZIG, 
THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM 11 (St. Martin's Press, 5th ed. 1973). 
2. The Eurocurrency deposit operation involves only three groups of participants. See e.g., 
E. WAYNE CLENDENNING, THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 16 (Clarendon Press, 1970). These 
commentators prefer to group both the depository banks and the other intermediary banks in the 
interbank market into the same category. Id. While this approach may be appropriate as a form 
of classification, it would seem more appropriate, for the purpose achieving clarity in the 
subsequent analysis of the mechanics of Eurocurrency deposit and interbank placement 
operations, to adopt the approach used in this work. 
3. CLENDENNING, supra note 2, at 44; MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 46-47 (Dow 
Jones-Irwin 3d ed. 1990). 
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international trade of their customers. When acting as financial 
intermediaries, commercial banks contribute also to the supply of 
eurocurrency by engaging in deposit expansion, that is the process of 
placing funds deposited with them in the interbank market. 
Institutions such as private corporations, as well as individuals 
engaged in international business, may also supply eurocurrency when 
they deposit their receipts in banks outside the country of issue of the 
currency involved. Such individuals and corporations may possess 
extensive reserves of foreign currency outside their own countries as 
proceeds from international trade. They may prefer to hold such deposits 
in foreign currency for a variety of reasons. First, they would prefer to 
hold the currency in banks outside the country of issue and their own 
countries because of the higher rates offered. Other reasons could also 
include the relative convenience of holding that particular currency as 
against others and the cost involved in exchanging the currency for local 
currency. 
B. The Depository Banks 
The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement 
operation, are the commercial banks, acting as depository institutions and, 
in most cases, also playing an important role as financial intermediaries. 
When the intermediary (depository) bank takes or accepts funds it may do 
any of three things: (1) it may lend the deposit directly to borrowers, 
assuming that borrowers who have immediate needs for a loan in that 
currency exist; (2) it may seek an outlet for the funds by placing them in 
the interbank market; and (3) it may use the funds to meet its own liquidity 
requirements. 
C. The Intermediary Banks 
The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement 
process are the intermediary banks in the interbank market. Although it is 
possible to regard such banks as belonging in the same category as the 
initial depository institutions, the functions that the interbank market 
performs in the eurocurrency market, requires their separate consideration. 
The eurocurrency market is primarily an interbank market where the initial 
deposit or placement of funds is passed from bank to bank under the 
process of deposit expansion. At one end of the chain of transactions is the 
initial depository bank and at the other end may be the final users of the 
funds. Inbetween these two participants may be a chain of other 
intermediary commercial banks who take the deposits and loan the funds 
3
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at narrow margins to other banks.4 Interbank eurocurrency trading is 
conducted both between eurocurrency centers and within eurocurrency 
centers. 5 Both forms of interbank trading fulfil specific functions. 
Trading within a eurocurrency center promotes liquidity smoothing, 
liquidity transfer and currency transfer. 6 Liquidity smoothing involves the 
process where banks seek to manage the structure of their assets and 
liabilities and reduce transaction costs. This is usually achieved by the 
transmutation of assets during the process of financial intermediation. The 
transmutation of assets takes place when the eurobanks, by placing funds 
in the interbank market, are able not only to invest in claims of the final 
users and tailor such claims to meet the user's needs, but also are able to 
change the form of these claims. They then issue liabilities on themselves, 
tailored to meet the maturity and liquidity needs of the initial depositors or 
investors. Liquidity transfer is the transfer of liquidity from one bank to 
another, reflecting the reality that not all banks are able to attract funds 
from primary sources. Finally, currency transfer involves the process 
where the eurobanks are enabled to match the currency composition of 
their assets through the use of the interbank market, and thus avoid foreign 
exchange exposure. 
Interbank trading between centers, on the other hand, promotes 
global liquidity distribution. Global liquidity distribution, in simple terms, 
is the process of using the interbank market to normalize the demand and 
supply of funds in individual local markets and to reduce transaction costs 
that would otherwise prevail in transactions between banks of different 
jurisdictions. The main function of the interbank market is, thus, to reduce 
the risk inherent in the operation of the eurocurrency market, by spreading 
such risk among a number of commercial banks according to the degree of 
risk that the particular bank is prepared to accept. 
D. The Borrowers: Final Users of Eurocurrency Deposits 
The final users of funds placed in the eurocurrency market include 
official institutions, commercial banks, other financial institutions, and 
individuals. Since most of these users of the funds may employ the funds 
borrowed in any number of ways, it is difficult to determine in precise 
terms the exact range of final users. Although official institutions play an 
important role as suppliers of eurocurrency, they are relatively small users 
of such funds as compared to other users. In most cases, official users 
4. The mechanics of the interbank placement transaction are considered later in the article. 
5. EUGENE SARVER, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET HANDBOOK 204 (Prentice Hall 1988). 
6. ANDREASHAINDL, THE EURO MONEY MARKET 47 (Paul Haupt 1991). 
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such as governments and quasi-government instrumentalities, take funds 
in the form of loans and, depending on the amount involved, the loan may 
take the form of syndicated eurocurrency credits. 
The predominant users of the funds deposited in the offshore 
currency market are commercial banks. As has been observed above, 
commercial banks make a great deal of use of the interbank market in the 
process of intermediation. Although commercial banks may channel 
funds to other users, the offshore currency market also serves the liquidity 
needs of the commercial banks. 
Other private sector users of eurocurrency are international firms and 
individuals. In all these cases, the users of eurocurrency may incur 
different kinds of liability to the financial intermediaries. For example, 
while a sovereign borrower may take the funds in the form of a syndicated 
loan, corporations may prefer to issue notes or commercial paper in 
exchange for the funds. 
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT 
In the process of moving funds from the initial depositors of the 
funds to the ultimate users, intermediary banks rely on the services of 
correspondent banks as well as on those of electronic funds transfer 
mechanisms. It is thus appropriate to discuss the role of correspondent 
banks in attempting the electronic funds transfer process before an 
examination of the mechanics of the placement process. 
A. The Role of Correspondent Banks 
It is important to distinguish correspondent banking from the 
financial intermediation of commercial banks engaged in eurocurrency 
placements, both of which take place in the interbank market. Financial 
intermediation is the process where financial intermediaries, in most cases 
banks, but which could also include brokerage houses, place themselves 
between the suppliers of the funds and the users of those funds. More 
often than not, financial intermediation in the interbank market takes place 
as an integral part of the interbank offshore currency placement process. 
Correspondent banking may also take place in the interbank market, 
as part of the offshore currency deposit and placement process. This is 
usually the situation where an initial deposit is placed in the interbank 
market by a depository bank, as opposed to being loaned directly to a 
borrower. However, this is the only similarity between the two concepts. 
Correspondent banking refers to the system of "reciprocal bank accounts 
5
Kwaw: The Evolving Law On The Eurobank-Customer Relationship And The Co
Published by SURFACE, 2004
92 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 32:87 
between participating institutions"7 created to facilitate receipts and 
payment in foreign currency. 8 Although correspondent banking also 
occurs in the domestic context, this section of this article is concerned with 
correspondent banking in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. In 
international banking, in general, it is usual for domestic banks with 
substantial international affairs to open accounts in their names with banks 
overseas, through and into which payments of foreign currency may be 
made or received. These correspondent accounts are referred to as nostro 
and vostro accounts, primarily in Europe,9 or due from and due to accounts 
respectively in North America. 10 Nostro account means our account 
maintained at another institution, while vostro account means your 
account with us. 
Thus if X Bank, located in the U.S., has deposits of dollars with Y 
Bank in the United Kingdom, the nostro or due from account of X Bank 
will reflect the amount of dollars on deposit with its United Kingdom 
correspondent Y Bank. 11 Likewise, from the perspective of Y Bank, the 
vostro or due to account ofX Bank, will reflect the amount of U.S. dollars 
that the correspondent of Y Bank, X Bank, maintains with it. 12 The 
process of correspondent banking is facilitated by the use of automated or 
electronic fund transfer systems, by means of which the accounts of the 
respective banks are debited or credited. 
B. The Role of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems 
The eurocurrency market works essentially through a network of 
telecommunication lines that link various eurocurrency centers and banks. 
Although there are other methods of funds transfer, such as the use of 
airmail, bank checks and drafts, a large percentage of international 
interbank eurocurrency transfers are effected electronically.13 This is so 
for several reasons. First, the eurocurrency market being a wholesale 
market deals in large quantities in funds, with relatively short-term 
maturities. It is thus expedient to use a mode of fund transfer that 
7. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 157. 
8. DONALD I. BAKER AND RONALD E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS 
TRANSFERS 29-2(Warren et al. eds., 1988). 
9. STIGUM, supra note 3, at 202. 
10. Id. 
11. See generally BAKER AND BRANDEL, supra note 8. 
12. Id. 
13. Banking Technology: The Interbank Networks, EUROMONEY 128 (1987); see also 
BENJAMIN GEY A, THE LA w OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS ( 1992) [hereinafter GEY A LA w OF 
EFT]. 
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combines speed with security. 14 Secondly, because eurocurrency 
transactions usually involve parties separated from each other by long 
distances, it is necessary to use electronic transfer systems to bring them 
closer together. Furthermore, because eurocurrency are funds 
denominated in currency held on the books of banks outside the country of 
issue, except those eurodollars held in international banking facilities in 
the United States, the financial institutions concerned do not have access 
to those currencies with which they deal. 15 This creates the need for 
correspondent banks, which may have direct access to those funds, and the 
need to link such institutions to facilitate transactions. The role of 
electronic funds transfer systems is, thus, to link financial institutions 
separated by time and space, to facilitate international financial 
transactions. The majority of international funds transfers are processed 
by two main organizations, depending on whether the funds transfer 
involves the U.S. dollar or some other currency. These two organizations 
are the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
(SWIFT)16 and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(CHIPS). 17 While SWIFT is an international communications network for 
all currencies, CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House 
Association and is therefore, the private clearing system for only U.S. 
dollars. 18 
SWIFT is not a funds transfer system, but facilitates the transfer of 
14. Benjamin Geva, International Funds Transfers: Performances by Wire Payment, 4 
BANKING AND FINANCE L. REV., at 113-14. (1990) 
15. Urech, supra note 1, at 16; CARREAU, supra note 1, at 148. 
16. SWIFT, a non-profit cooperative company organized under Belgian law, was 
founded in 1973 by 239 European, American and Canadian banks and is currently owned by 
about 1,650 member banks. Each year the members of SWIFT elect a board of directors, 
which in tum chooses a general manager, vested with the authority to make decisions 
concerning the use of the facilities of SWIFT. Membership of SWIFT is open to 
organizations engaged in the business of banking and in the transmission of financial 
messages. Currently, the facilities of SWIFT are used by over 2,600 financial institutions in 
over 65 countries. For other discussion of SWIFT and related aspects of its operations, see 
generally Ezra U. Byler and James C. Baker, SWIFT: A Fast Method to Facilitate 
International Financial Transactions 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 485 (1983); Jeffery S. 
Tallackson & Norma Vallejo, International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of 
Standards 11 N . C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (1986); John S. Santa Lucia, Losses from 
International Electronic Funds Transfers: Time to Unify the Law (1988) 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & 
Bus. 759 (1988); Herbert F. Lingl, Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic 
Funds Transfers: Chips and SWIFT 22 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 621 (1981); GEVA LAW OF EFT, 
supra note 13, § 4-35. 
17. See also Deborah S. Prutzman, Chips and the Proposed Uniform New Payments Code 
10 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TECH. L.J 1 (1983); GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, at ch. 3. 
18. Benjamin Geva, CHIPS Transfer of Funds 4 J. INT'L BANKING L. 208 (1987); see also 
GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, § 3-23. 
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funds through the provision of a reliable and fast telecommunications 
network for transmitting messages concerning funds. 19 Since the primary 
purpose of SWIFT is to transmit messages for its members, the members 
of SWIFT use its network not only to transmit messages concerning funds 
transfer in a variety of currencies but also for other operations including 
debit and credit advices, statements, foreign exchange operations and 
money market confirmations, collections, documentary credits, interbank 
securities trading and balance reporting. In the context of the transmission 
of payment messages, the actual settlement of payment between the banks 
is effected by debits and credits to accounts of those banks or to 
correspondent bank accounts. 20 
CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House Association 
and is the international private clearing system for large dollar transfers. 
This means that all wholesale international transactions involving the use 
of the dollar go through CHIPS.21 CHIPS, is thus, a settlement as well as 
a communications network. 22 Since the CHIPS network is the clearing 
system for euro-dollar transactions, its role is limited to transmitting 
payment messages concerning dollar transactions between payor-sending-
bank participants and payee-receiving-bank participants in the New York 
interbank payments system. Almost invariably therefore, a transaction or 
payments message that originates outside the New York Interbank 
Payments System and involves the use of dollars, originates as a SWIFT 
message, and is eventually settled in New York via CHIPS. 
C. The Eurocurrency Deposit Operation 
With the above discussion about correspondent banking and the 
electronic funds transfer system that facilitates eurocurrency depositing as 
a background, it is now possible to examine the nature of a typical 
eurocurrency deposit and placement transaction and to examine the legal 
relationships that arise in such a transaction. A typical situation of the 
deposit and transfer of funds denominated in U.S. dollars in the 
eurocurrency market could take place in the following manner. Assume 
19. Geva, supra note 14, at 116; GEVA LAW OF EFT, supra note 13, § 4-35. 
20. Geva, supra note 14, at 112. 
21. SARVER, supra note 5, at 207; LINGL, supra note 16, at 626; GEVA LAW OF EFT, supra 
note 13, § 3-23. Theoretically, transfers of dollars could also pass through another U.S. wire 
transfer system-FEDWIRE. It is the Federal Reserve System's national electronic 
communications network. While CHIPS makes available same day funds, FEDWIRE provides 
immediately available Federal Reserve funds. Although no restrictions are imposed by either 
CHIPS or FEDWIRE on the kinds of payment transmitted via either system, in practice 
FEDWIRE attracts securities transactions while CHIPS attracts foreign exchange transactions. 
22. GEVALAWOFEFT, supra note 13, § 3-23, ~3.03. 
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the following facts: a fictitious Kingdom of Peruvia has a central bank 
called Peruvia National Bank. Peruvia National Bank maintains an 
account with a U.S.-based Bank (Citizens Bank), into which it receives 
payment in US dollars. The current balance of Peruvia National Bank's 
account with Citizens Bank now stands at $10 million. Assume that the 
government and directors of the Peruvia National Bank decide that instead 
ofletting the funds sit idle in the U.S. bank they could be transferred into a 
euro-dollar account in the United Kingdom at an advantageous rate of 
interest and Peruvia concludes a deal with the relevant U.K. bank (Abbey 
Bank). As discussed previously, the method of operating offshore 
currency deposits in general and eurocurrency deposits, creates a 
distinction between (1) the deposit of funds by depositors who are the 
lenders of the funds and (2) the interbank placement or bank-to-bank 
trading of deposited funds. This distinction influences the nature of the 
current practice in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. According to 
the current practice, when the eurocurrency depositor is a sophisticated 
customer, as opposed to a bank seeking to make an interbank placement, it 
is usual for the eurocurrency deposit to be formally documented pursuant 
to negotiations between such a customer and the depository eurobank. 
Depending on the negotiations between the eurobank and the customer, 
the documentation of the eurocurrency deposit may relate to any of the 
following: ( 1) time or fixed term deposit evidenced by a written contract; 
(2) a time or fixed term deposit evidenced by a certificate of deposit;23 and 
(3) a call deposit or call money. 24 In the scenario used in this section the 
23. For the purposes of withdrawal, bank deposits may be classified into (1) demand 
deposits and (2) time or fixed term deposits. While demand deposits may be withdrawn or 
transferred by a depositor without notice, time deposits may only be withdrawn at a specified 
future date or maturity date. Savings deposits are a kind of time deposit because, in general, the 
bank reserves the right to require notice before withdrawal. However, unlike time deposits 
evidenced by certificates of deposit and those evidenced by written contracts, which are interest 
bearing deposits with specific maturities, savings deposits do not have fixed maturities. Time or 
fixed term deposits have not always been evidenced by negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs), 
and currently may not always be so evidenced. Time deposits began to be evidenced by CDs 
when banks located in London, compelled by the desire to satisfy the demands of their 
customers for liquidity, began to issue dollar denominated CDs. Currently, CDs issued in the 
London money market are denominated in a variety of currencies, including Yen, Can$, Aus$, 
SDR, ECU, NZ$, Lire, N.Kr., and D.Kr. See generally, LONDON CODE OF CONDUCT: FOR 
PRINCIPALS AND BROKING FIRMS IN THE WHOLESALE MARKETS 20 (1992) [hereinafter LONDON 
CODE OF CONDUCT]. There is no universally accepted format for time or fixed term deposits 
evidenced by written contract and each bank adopts its own unique contractual format and 
documentation. 
24. See STIGUM, supra note 3, at 225 (explaining that a substantial amount of funds placed 
in offshore accounts take the form of call money. Call accounts may be same day value, 2-day 
notice and 7-day notice accounts .. Call money is more attractive to various investors because of 
its comparative liquidity when compared with time or fixed term deposits. Although a time or 
9
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relevant negotiations and transfer of funds by Citizens Bank on behalf of 
Peruvia National Bank to Abbey Bank may give rise to a variety of 
formally documented deposit contracts, which are in reality loan contracts. 
The depositor concerned (Peruvia National Bank) is the lender of the 
funds, while the depository institution (Abbey Bank) is the borrower. The 
eurocurrency deposit in question may be ( 1) a time or fixed term deposit 
evidenced by a written contract; (2) a time deposit evidenced by a 
certificate of deposit; and (3) a call deposit or call money. A time or fixed 
term deposit, must be distinguished from a call deposit or call money. 
While a fixed term deposit or time deposit is an interest bearing 
deposit with a specific maturity, a call deposit does not have any specific 
maturity. Call money is so called because it is said to be "on call," that is 
it is left on deposit without any specific maturity date and is withdraw-able 
usually on a day's notice. Where a time or fixed term deposit is evidenced 
by a written contract, the written contract, which specifies the terms of the 
contract, constitutes an acceptance by the bank of the terms of the loan 
negotiated. The terms of the time deposit contract25 will usually include 
( 1) the currency of account; (2) the duration of the deposit; (3) the interest 
rate; (4) the date of the deal; (5) the value and maturity dates; (6) the 
amount of interest; (7) the place of repayment; and (8) the payment 
mechanisms and processes. According to current practice, call deposits 
are neither evidenced by formal documentation nor standardized 
confirmations. The documentation of call accounts are, the statements that 
are sent by the depository bank, upon request via SWIFT, to the 
depositor.26 Call deposits are not formally documented, that being the 
fastest moving sector of the interbank deposit market, the issuance and 
safekeeping of formal documentation becomes too cumbersome, if not too 
expensive. In the above scenario, if the deposit of "Peruvia National 
Bank" is a call deposit, "Abbey Bank" will send only a statement to 
"Peruvia National Bank" upon request from the latter. 
In concrete terms, the above euro-dollar deal will take place in the 
following manner: assuming Abbey Bank has no correspondent 
relationship with Citizens Bank, but has a correspondent relationship with 
another U.S. bank called National Bank, the transfer may be effected with 
fixed term deposit bears a higher rate of interest, withdrawal prior to maturity attracts a penalty). 
25. For some banks, for example, the Channel Islands Branch of the Royal Bank of 
Canada, the time or fixed term deposit contract is also referred to as a Fixed Term Deposit 
Confirmation. Despite its name, this is the only documentation which a depositor of funds 
receives, showing the amount of funds held at a eurobank. According to market practice then, 
this documentation, although referred to as a confirmation, constitutes a fixed term contract. 
26. See generally Edmund M.A. Kwaw, GREY AREAS IN EUROCURRENCY DEPOSITS AND 
PLACEMENTS: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME (1990). 
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the services of the correspondent bank. Following instructions from 
Abbey Bank, Citizens Bank will effect a transfer via CHIPS to National 
Bank for the correspondent account of Abbey Bank. 27 
Upon receipt of the transfer message National Bank will, in turn, 
credit the vostro account of Abbey Bank. National Bank will then effect a 
transfer message to Abbey Bank using a funds transfer media such as 
SWIFT. Upon receipt of the transfer message, Abbey Bank will credit the 
account of Peruvia National Bank with the amount of $10 million and it 
will credit its nostro account with National Bank. 
According to current practice, a necessary and final safeguard against 
the possibility of dealing errors is provided by the exchange of 
confirmations between the various participants. 28 In our present scenario, 
a confirmation will be sent to Peruvia National Bank by Abbey Bank 
showing the funds deposited with the latter. In general, a confirmation 
sent by a receiving bank (Abbey Bank) to the depositor (Peruvia National 
Bank), does not constitute an acknowledgment of funds received by the 
receiving bank (Abbey Bank), but only an agreement concerning the 
interbank placement of the funds to be received. The terms negotiated 
between Peruvia National Bank and the receiving bank (Abbey Bank), as 
documented on the confirmation form, onl~ become effective upon the 
receipt of the funds by the receiving bank. 9 With respect to interbank 
placements, the confirmation sent to the transmitting bank is usually the 
only documentation concerning the placement of funds, which the bank 
receives. Such a confirmation, is thus, considered to be a contract between 
the banks concerned. 
Where the fixed term or time deposit is not evidenced by a certificate 
of deposit, a fixed term/time deposit contract or term deposit confirmation 
is sent to the depositor by the eurobank. This is also the only 
documentation showing funds held at the eurobank, which the depositor 
receives from the eurobank. Upon the receipt of funds by the receiving 
bank then, the confirmation, in addition to being ( 1) a confirmation of the 
transfer and (2) an acceptance by the receiving bank of the terms, is also 
(3) a fixed term deposit contract, or time deposit contract. Although a 
reference is being made to the receipt of funds, the actual specie in dollars, 
is not actually received by the receiving bank in the U .K. The term, 
27. If Abbey Bank has a correspondent relationship with Citizens Bank, the transfer 
operation will take place in the same bank, that is, by an in-house transfer. 
28. London Code of Conduct: For Principals and Brokering Firms in the Wholesale 
Markets, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 8, at ml 70-72 (1999), available at 
http:/www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited on Oct. 20, 2004). 
29. Some confirmations will have a stipulation to that effect. 
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receipt of funds, denotes the process through which a credit to the vostro 
account of the receiving bank, Abbey Bank, and a corresponding credit to 
the accounts of Citizens Bank and National Bank at the Federal Reserve 
produce a payment to Abbey Bank. 
As a result of the above transactions, specific accounting entries will 
be made in this manner. The books of Abbey Bank will show a credit in 
favor of Peruvia National Bank to the tune of $10 million and a 
corresponding liability on its own part. In the books of National Bank, the 
vostro, or due to account of Abbey Bank will be credited with the amount 
of $10 million. The books of Citizens Bank will show a debit of the same 
amount with respect to the account of Peruvia National Bank. The book 
entries made with Abbey Bank in the U .K. thus, reflect the corresponding 
entries made in the books of its correspondent, National Bank, in the U.S. 
This, in turn, reflects the changing nature of the claims involved. They are 
therefore, not independent accounts and have sometimes been referred to 
as mirror accounts.30 
By giving up its claim against Citizens Bank, Peruvia National Bank 
now acquires a claim against a U .K. bank, Abbey Bank. Likewise, the 
original claim held by Peruvia National Bank against Citizens Bank now 
becomes a claim of the U.K. bank-Abbey Bank-against the U.S. bank, 
National Bank. Payment or settlement as between the two U.S. banks, 
Citizens Bank and National Bank, will usually be effected by the transfer 
of funds from and to accounts that both banks maintain with the federal 
reserve. 
Thus, although Peruvia National Bank regards itself as holding 
dollars in Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom, the funds, which are the 
subject matter of the deposit and transfer operation, never leave the United 
States. Because Abbey Bank possesses a correspondent account with 
National Bank in the U.S., a transfer from the Federal Reserve account of 
Citizens Bank to that of National Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank in 
New York, moves the funds from Citizens Bank in the U.S. to Abbey 
Bank in the United Kingdom. It is this kind of transfer operation that some 
writers have in mind when they argue that, in the funds transfer process, 
the funds (in this case dollars) never leave the country of issue.31 The 
scenario involving Peruvia National Bank is intended to illustrate what has 
come to be accepted as the usual practice of the eurodollar deposit 
operation in particular and eurocurrency operations in general. 32 
30. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 160. 
31. STIGUM, supra note 3, at 200; HAINDL, supra note 6, at 50. 
32. Roy M. Goode, Concepts of Payment in Relation to the Expropriation or Freezing of 
Bank Deposits, J.I.B.L., 82-83, (2) (1987); see also Marco A. Jagmeti, Money and Payment 9 
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1. The Deposit Repayment Process 
The repayment of a eurocurrency deposit may be effected in two 
main ways. The first way of repaying a eurocurrency deposit is with the 
use of "in-house" or correspondent bank transfers. 33 The second method 
is to effect payment via the country of issue of the currency that is the 
subject matter of the deposit contract. 
i. Repayment by In-House Transfers 
An in-house transfer generally refers to the transfer of funds between 
accounts held at either the same branch of a bank or at different branches 
of the same bank. Where two parties, A and B, maintain accounts at the 
same branch and A wants to make payment to B, an in-house transfer may 
be used to effect payment. The bank concerned merely debits the account 
of A and credits the account of B. In the international context, the use of 
an in-house transfer to effect payment may take place with or without the 
intermediary assistance of a correspondent bank. Assume that Peruvia 
National Bank, in the scenario used above, wishes to be repaid its $10 
million held at Abbey Bank in the U.K., an in-house transfer, without the 
assistance of a correspondent bank, could be used to effect payment. This 
is possible where both Abbey Bank and Peruvia National Bank have 
correspondent account relationships with the same bank. Suppose both 
Peruvia National Bank and Abbey Bank maintain accounts with another 
bank in France called Banque Internationale. All that is necessary to repay 
the deposit of Peruvia National Bank, is for Abbey Bank to debit the 
account of Peruvia National Bank and then instruct Banque Internationale 
to transfer the funds from its account into that of Peruvia National Bank. 
Banque Internationale will then debit the vostro account of Abbey Bank 
and credit the vostro account of Peruvia National Bank. The transfer of 
funds between accounts maintained at the same bank is the in-house 
transfer. 
ii. Repayment by Correspondent Bank Transfers 
In the international context, where the concerned banks or parties do 
not maintain an account with the same branch of a bank, the services of a 
correspondent bank are usually required to facilitate the transfer of funds 
from payor to payee at the different banks. Correspondent banking refers 
to the system of reciprocal bank account relationships between banks. 
INT'LBUS. L., 95 (1981); Kwaw, supra note 26. 
33. Hal Scott, Where are the Eurodollars?-0.ffshore Funds Transfers 3 BANKING AND 
FIN. L. REV. XX 282-86 (1988-89). 
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Although correspondent banking is also used in the domestic context, 
in the international context it facilitates receipts and payments of foreign 
currency. In a very simple correspondent bank transfer, a sending or 
originating bank, upon the receipt of instructions from its customer, will 
effect a transfer message to another bank (the receiving bank) to make 
payment to a payee who maintains an account at the receiving bank. 
Payment, as between the sending or originating bank and the receiving 
bank, is effected by corresponding debit and credit entries to 
correspondent accounts maintained with each other. This usually means 
that the originating or sending bank must have sufficient funds in its 
correspondent account with the receiving bank to cover the amount of the 
transfer. 
In international banking transactions and eurocurrency transactions 
for that matter, correspondent banks may be used to transfer funds either 
to and from ( 1) parties who hold funds with banks outside countries of 
issue or (2) parties who hold funds with banks inside countries of issue. In 
the latter situation, this usually involves the use of the clearing and 
settlement system of the country of issue. 
iii. Repayment via the Clearing System of the Country of Issue 
The repayment of eurocurrency does not have to pass through the 
clearing and settlement system of the country of issue where in-house and 
correspondent bank transfers are used. However, this is the current 
practice. When a eurobank accepts a deposit denominated in the currency 
of another country it undertakes certain obligations, including the 
obligation to repay, which in most cases is carried out by causin~ acts that 
take place in the country of issue of the currency concerned. 4 This is 
because, as a general rule, most payment obligations involving the 
delivery and collection of eurocurrency take place in the country of issue 
according to the rules of its clearing system. In the scenario used above, 
the repayment obligation of Abbey Bank, located in the U.K., although 
capable of being performed outside the U.S. in the manner described 
above, will, according to current practice, be performed in the U.S. This 
will be done by the delivery and collection of dollars in National Bank or 
another bank in the U.S. nominated by the customer, Peruvia National 
Bank. 
Since repayments of eurocurrency are so frequently made through the 
country of issue of the currency concerned, as opposed to the use of in-
34. See Goode, supra note 32; Jagmeti, supra note 32; CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161-63; 
Edmund M. A. Kwaw, Determining the Proper Law to Govern the Eurocurrency Deposit 
Contract 18 QUEEN'S L. J. 440, 445 (1993). 
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house and correspondent bank transfers, it is possible to argue that it is an 
implied term of eurocurrency deposit contracts that repayments are to be 
made via the clearing and settlement system of the country of issue.35 This 
is also dictated by practical considerations. 
Only a globally organized system for clearing and netting large sums 
in a variety of currencies, will lead to an efficient functioning of the 
repayments process. 36 Since no such organization exists, all payments of 
eurocurrency have to go through the only systems which currently 
possesses the facilities for collecting and netting large sums of foreign 
currency: the clearing systems of the countries of issue.37 This is purely 
practical, given that ( 1) central banks of the countries of issue of various 
major currencies are the only ones which will accept the responsibility for 
supplying unlimited quantities of that currency and (2) these central banks 
are committed only to their own clearing banks. 
Unlike the domestic banking context then, in the eurocurrency 
deposit context there are three stages in the repayment process, namely ( 1) 
the demand for payment; (2) the preparation by the offshore bank to effect 
payment; and (3) actual payment, that is, the delivery of funds by a bank 
in the country of issue. While all three stages may take place in the same 
bank in the domestic context, only the first two stages take place at the 
eurobank in the eurocurrency deposit context. Thus, in the above scenario, 
when Peruvia National Bank wishes to be repaid its deposit, it will make a 
demand to be repaid in the U.K. at the branch of Abbey Bank where the 
deposit is maintained. Since Abbey Bank does not have access to the 
funds, it can only instruct its correspondent in the country of issue to make 
the relevant transfer to the account of Peruvia National Bank, against a 
promise by Abbey Bank to subsequently provide cover.38 Abbey Bank 
consequently sends a transfer message for that purpose. This is the second 
stage in the process of repaying eurocurrency or what this work refers to 
as the preparation to make repayment. The third stage, the actual delivery 
of the funds: payment per se, although capable of avoiding the clearing 
system of the U.S., as explained above, will, in most cases, take place in 
the U.S. The account of Peruvia National Bank is then credited and the 
corresponding debits and credits are effected in the accounts of Citizens 
Bank and National Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank. 
35. Goode, supra note 32. 
36. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161; see also JOHN E. HOFFMAN, JR., THE IRANIAN ASSETS 
LITIGATION, IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS IN 1980, 350 (Martha L. Landwehr. Ed., Matthew Bender 1980). 
37. CARREAU, supra note 1, at 161; Hoffinan, supra note 36, at 350. 
38. Urech, supra note 1, at 16. 
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2. The Interbank Placement Operation 
As observed at the beginning of this chapter, the deposit side of the 
eurocurrency market also includes the bank-to-bank deposit of funds, or 
the interbank placement. The mechanics of the interbank placement 
process may be described using the hypothetical eurocurrency deposit 
operation discussed above. Using this scenario then, assuming that Abbey 
Bank, after receiving the deposit of Peruvia National Bank does not want 
the funds to sit idle on its books in the U .K., it may decide to place it in the 
interbank market by depositing it with another eurobank in France 
(Banque Internationale). This assumes that Banque Internationale is 
prepared to pay a higher rate for the funds. If Banque Internationale also 
cannot find immediate use for the funds deposited with it, it will also 
deposit it in the interbank market. At each stage in this interbank 
placement process, the next bank pays a slightly higher rate than the 
previous bank does. The margins involved in the interbank market are 
usually very small. It is important to note, that the redepositing of the 
funds in the interbank market, does not add to the final extension of credit 
in the financial markets, but only involves the passing of funds from bank 
to bank. 
The mechanics of the interbank placement operation involving some 
or all of the above parties could take place in the following manner. Abbey 
Bank will contact Banque Internationale over the phone and request the 
latter to provide it with its bid or deposit rates for deposits of various 
maturities in both France and England. Assuming the rate available in the 
Paris branch of Banque Internationale is higher, Abbey Bank will 
negotiate with Banque Internationale (Paris) to place the $10 million for 
example, for one month, in the Paris branch of the latter bank. After an 
agreement is reached, the relevant book entries are made. If Banque 
Internationale also cannot find immediate use for the funds, it may also 
decide to deposit it with its London branch, which may decide to take the 
deposit on its books at approximately 1/32 of 1 per cent over the rate paid 
by the Paris branch. In this case the second funds placement takes place 
between two branches of the same bank. 
i. The Role of Brokerage Firms 
The above interbank placement operations could also take place with 
the assistance of brokerage firms. For example, if the London branch of 
Banque Internationale decides to invest the $10 million deposited with it at 
a profit, it may seek to lend the funds at as high a rate as possible. The use 
of a brokerage firm becomes indispensable in this context. Since it is 
generally difficult to find the appropriate bank, willing to pay the 
16
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appropriate rate, brokers, who possess a comparative advantage in the 
possession of the relevant information, act as intermediaries between 
banks in the interbank market. Thus, the London branch of Banque 
Internationale may request a brokerage firm to provide it with the bid or 
deposit rates offered by various banks for call, 7-day, 30-day, 90-day,180-
day and 270-day deposits, denominated in a variety of currencies. On this 
basis, the London branch of Banque Internationale is able to make an 
informed decision as to whether it wants to place the funds or swap 
currencies. Assuming it decides to place the funds at a bank in Japan, 
Sumitomo Bank, it will convey this decision to the broker. The broker will 
then contact the eurocurrency dealing department of Sumitomo Bank by 
phone or telex, to close the deal. The broker earns a fee of about 1./32of1 
per cent. Confirmation of the deal is transmitted to the London branch of 
Banque Internationale and the message to transfer funds to the Japanese 
bank, is transmitted via SWIFT, to correspondent banks in Japan, which 
then effect the transfer. 
As already noted above, as between banks, the interbank placement 
of eurocurrency is not formally documented, only confirmations are sent 
between the parties. Thus, while the deposit contract between Peruvia 
National Bank and Abbey Bank may be formally evidenced by a 
certificate of deposit or a fixed term deposit contract, the interbank 
placement operations between Abbey Bank and Banque Internationale in 
Paris, or that between Banque Internationale in London and Sumitomo 
Bank in Japan, are not evidenced by formal contractual documents but by 
mere entries on the books of the banks concerned. All transactions are 
carried out informally via the telephone, telex or fax and confirmations of 
the deal are exchanged. Confirmations of financial deals may also be made 
by telephone, in writing or using other electronic media. 
Although there is no standardized format for such confirmations, for 
banks operating in the London wholesale markets, the London Code of 
Conducf9 recommends that all such confirmations sent by banks and 
other financial institutions engaged in wholesale market deals, include all 
the details of the transaction concerned.40 The current practice, however, 
is, that banks participating in the international money markets usually 
include their own terms and conditions of trading, in addition to the details 
of the deal, on such confirmations. According to a Royal Bank of Canada 
(RBC) standing order, for example, offshore branches of the RBC in 
issuing confirmations of deposit deals (whether by telephone or in 
39. London Code of Conduct: For Principals and Brokering Firms in the Wholesale 
Markets, supra note 28, at 8-9. 
40. Id. at 9. 
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writing), must include details including; ( 1) the banks full name and 
address, including telephone and fax numbers; (2) the type of transaction; 
(3) the counterparty's full name and address; (4) the amounts and 
currencies involved; ( 5) the value and maturity dates; ( 6) the interest rates 
agreed upon, including the basis of calculation, that is, whether 360 or 365 
days; and (7) details concerning payment.41 It is therefore reasonable to 
infer that Sumitomo Bank will send a confirmation to the London branch 
of Banque Internationale containing similar terms. 42 As mentioned before, 
since such written confirmations are the only documents showing monies 
held at the other banks, which the banks placing the funds will receive, 
such confirmations are regarded as contracts according to market practice. 
Ill. THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The deposit and placement of eurocurrency, and the process of 
making payments via electronic funds transfers, gives rise to legal 
relationships between the involved participants. These relationships 
include that between the: (1) depositary bank and the customer; (2) 
depositary bank and the correspondent bank; (3) customer and the 
correspondent bank; and (4) beneficiary/destination bank and the payee. 
Although these same legal relationships could occur in the domestic 
context, the legal significance of these relationships differs in the 
eurobanking context. 
A. The Relationship Between Customer and Eurobank 
In the eurobanking context, the relationship between the customer 
and the eurobank can be divided into two stages, namely the depositary 
relationship and the funds transfer relationship. The depositary 
relationship is concerned with the opening of the eurocurrency account 
and the subsequent transfer of funds into that account. Whereas the funds 
transfer relationship is concerned with the transfer of funds from the 
account into another account specified by the customer. 
1. The depositary relationship 
Similar to the deposit relationship in the domestic context, the legal 
41. Royal Bank of Canada: Standing Order No. 8.05, Deal Confirmations Revised 1992, 
Royal Bank of Canada, London [hereinafter RBC Standing Order No. 8.05]. 
42. It is the current practice for the Royal Bank of Canada located in London, for example, 
to treat telephone confirmations as only temporary. Telephone confirmations, according to RBC 
Standing Order No. 8.05, are to be recorded and kept until all transactions are paper confirmed 
and settlement effected. Written confirmations are also to be kept until matching confirmations 
are received from the other bank. 
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character of the depositary relationship in the eurobanking context is that 
of a contract and falls within the general common law rules regarding 
ordinary accounts in the banker-customer relationship.43 Like the 
relationship between the banker and the customer regarding ordinary or 
general deposits in the common law, the relationship between the 
depositary eurobank and the customer commences immediately when both 
parties begin negotiations and enter into a relationship that is to be part of 
the eventual contract.44 Generally, negotiations that do not result in any 
agreement, cannot establish a relationship.45 
The contractual depositary relationship between the eurobank and the 
customer, like the ordinary banker-customer deposit relationship, consists 
of reciprocal rights and duties that are founded on the practices and usages 
of domestic banking as well as the eurocurrency market. The classic 
statement of the nature of the reciprocal rights and duties of a depositing 
customer and bank, in the domestic context, is that of Atkin L.J. in 
Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation. 46 According to Atkin, in the 
domestic context, when a customer deposits money with a bank, 
[t]he bank undertakes to receive money and to collect bills 
for its customer's account. The proceeds so received are not to 
be held in trust for the customer, but the bank borrows the 
proceeds and undertakes to repay them. The promise to repay 
is to repay at the branch of the bank where the account is kept, 
and during banking hours ... The customer on his part 
undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written 
orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate a forgery. I 
think it is necessarily a term of such contract that the bank is 
not liable to pay the customer the full amount of his balance 
until he demands payment from the bank at the branch at 
which the current account is kept. (emphasis added) 
Thus, in both the traditional domestic banker customer deposit 
43. It is very important to observe that there are varieties of banker-customer relationships. 
For instance, the relationship between the bank and its customer when the bank provides 
financial advice is considered to be fiduciary. Where a customer places personal property in a 
bank for safe keeping, the relationship becomes one of bailment. See MARGARET H. OGILVIE 
CANADIAN BANKING LAW 435 (Carwell 2d ed. 1998); Foley v. Hill, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848); 
Burnt v. Westminster Bank Ltd., 1 Q.B. 742, 3 All E.R. 81 (1965.). 
44. MARK HAPGOOD PAGET'S LAW OF BANKING 161 (Butterworths, 11th ed. 1996); Ross 
CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 139-41 (Clarendon Press, 1997). 
45. Id. 
46. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp., 3 K.B. 110, (Eng. C.A. 1921). 
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relationship and the eurobanking relationship, the legal character of the 
contractual relationship between the bank and its customer is that of debtor 
and creditor. The depositor is the creditor and the bank is the debtor.47 The 
deposit is a loan, and in the absence of any special agreement that ~ualifies 
the relationship,48 the deposit becomes the property of the bank.4 In this 
traditional relationship the bank is not the bailee of the customer and does 
not hold the money in any fiduciary capacity. The legal title to the funds 
passes to the bank, 50 which has the right to mix it with other funds and to 
use as it sees fit. A liability in favor of the depositor is thus created. Since 
title to the money passes to the bank until demand is made, the bank 
cannot be said to have a lien on such funds that it owns. 51 
This is where the similarity ends between the domestic deposit 
relationship and the eurobanking relationship. The traditional common law 
rules and the approach of the eurobanking system differ when it comes to 
the repayment of the deposit by the bank. 
2. The problem of repayment and the place of repayment 
Lord Atkin' s well cited dictum provides that the promise of a bank to 
repay funds held on deposit is to do so at the branch of the bank where the 
account is kept. This approach of Lord Atkin with respect to the 
repayment obligation of a bank is based on an idea, derived from the era of 
47. Joachimson, 3 K.B. at 110; Foley, 9 Eng. Rep. at 1002; R. v. Davenport, 1 All E.R. 602 
(Crim. App. 1954); Laing v. Bank of New South Wales, 69 W.N 318 (N.S.W.S. Ct. 1952). 
Although the High Court decision in Laing was reversed by the Privy Council, it was not with 
respect to the nature of the banker customer relationship. See generally New York County Nat'! 
Bankv. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank 321 F. 2d 15 (2nd 
Cir. 1963); Royal Bank of Canada v. Boyce, [1996], 57 D.L.R. 683; Bank of Ottawa v. Hood 
[1908], 42 S.C.R. 231; Everly v. Dunkley [1912], 27 O.L.R. 414 (relevant U.S. and Canadian 
decisions). 
48. Deposits made with banks could be divided into two classes: special deposits and 
general deposits. With special deposits, the bank becomes the bailee of the customer and title to 
the money still remains with the customer. It has been held for instance that a deposit of money 
or property merely for safe keeping, is a special deposit. Such a special deposit may be in a safe 
deposit box or otherwise kept separately. The only determining criteria seems to be whether the 
depositor intended that the funds are (1) for a specific purpose not contemplating a credit to a 
general account; (2) to be segregated; and (3) to be returned intact on demand. With general 
deposits, the money is deposited in accordance with normal banking customs. The depositor, for 
his/her own convenience, parts with title to the money and lends it to the bank. The bank in 
consideration of the loan of the money and the right to use it as it sees fit, agrees to refund the 
money either in whole or in part, upon demand. Foley, 2 H.L. 28, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848); 
Royal Trust Co. v. Mo/sons Bank [1912] D.L.R. 478. 
49. Foley, 2 H.L. 28, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1848); Royal Trust Co. [1912] D.L.R. 478. 
50. See Davenport 1 All E.R. 602 (Crim. App. 1954). 
51. See Liberty Sav. Assoc. v. Sun Bank, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978); SA MICHIE ON 
BANKS AND BANKING 37 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. et. Al. eds., 2003). 
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the goldsmiths and the use of currency and coins in modem times, that 
money on deposit is specie or cash that has a situs or location. Where 
money is specie or cash held by a branch of a bank where a customer has 
an account it makes sense that the customer has to make a demand at that 
branch for repayment of his or her deposit. 52 The traditional common law 
approach to repayment is limited when it is applied to the eurocurrency 
market. 
As indicated above, when a customer such as Peruvia National Bank 
transfers funds from its account with Citizens bank in the United States 
into a eurodollar account with Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom no 
transfer, in the sense of a transfer of specie or cash, takes place. The 
obligation of Citizens Bank is not assigned to Abbey Bank. What happens 
is that upon the transfer of funds from Citizens Bank to Abbey Bank, the 
obligation of Citizens Bank to pay is notionally extinguished and is 
replaced by the obligation of Abbey Bank to pay the same amount that is 
transferred. However, because no transfer of cash or specie has actually 
taken place, Peruvia National Bank cannot obtain payment from Abbey 
Bank. It can demand payment from Abbey Bank, but because Abbey 
Bank, per se, has no funds, the only obligation of Abbey bank is to initiate 
the process that will result in Peruvia National Bank obtaining payment 
either via the clearing and settlement process in the United States or via in-
house or correspondent bank transfers. 
The shortcomings of the traditional common law respecting payment, 
as well as other matters, was exposed in Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank, 53 
and Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. 54 
i.Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank 
In Bank Makhazi Iran v. Citibank, President Carter of the United 
States, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 55 
52 . For an extensive discussion of the origins of the concept of payment see PAUL 
EINZIG PRIMITIVE MONEY (2d ed., Pergamon Press 1966) (1949); Kwaw, supra note 26, at § 
6; Redefining the Concept of Payment, 2 CANADIAN J. INT'L Bus. L. & POLICY 199 (1997); 
F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY (Clarendon Press, 5th ed. 1992); Benjamin 
Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History: On commerce Tyranny and the 
Modern Law of Money, 25 0SGOODE HALL L. 1. 115 (1987) . 
53. Writ dated 30 November 1979, Bank Markazi Iran v. Citibank, N.A., No. 1979-B-5903 
(Q.B.). 
54. Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. , 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. Comm. 
Ct. 1987). 
55 . 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2003). The statute, where relevant states as follows: Sec. 1702(a)(l) 
At times and to the extent specified in § 1701 of this title, the President may, under such 
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-(A) 
investigate, regulate, or prohibit-(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit 
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imposed a freeze on the worldwide assets of the Government of Iran in 
response to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, and the capture of 
hostages found in the compound, as well as the perceived threat to 
international world order posed by the Iranian regime. 56 At the time of the 
freeze order, Iranian assets that were subject to the freeze order, were in 
the region of $6 billion and were held at the London branches of U.S. 
banks. These assets collectively belonged to Bank Markazi Iran 
In November 1979, Bank Markhazi Iran, seeking to challenge the 
legality of the freeze order, commenced an action in London against the 
U.S. banks. The statement of claim of Bank Markhazi Iran, among other 
things, stated that ( 1) the defendant was indebted to Bank Markazi Iran for 
certain amounts in U.S. dollars, money which was held on account for 
Bank Markazi Iran at the London branch of the defendant, and (2) Bank 
Markazi Iran also owed payments of interest which had been demanded 
but had not been repaid. 57 
In their pleadings, Citibank, as well as the other defendant banks, put 
forward various arguments that they said justified their refusal to pay. One 
of these arguments is important for this article. Citibank argued that 
payment could not be made because of the freeze order, which explicitly 
referred to assets held by U.S. persons overseas. Citibank further argued, 
that even if the court in London held that the freeze order was void in the 
U.K., the order still made it illegal for the U.S. banks to make payment. 
The defendant also argued that it was well known to the depositor, Bank 
Markhazi Iran, that no payments could be made per se in London without 
the transfers going through the New York clearing system. Therefore, any 
payment made would immediately be subject to the freeze order. Payment 
to Bank Markhazi Iran was therefore impossible. In making this argument, 
the defendants in this case thus, sought to draw a distinction between the 
repayment of an ordinary domestic deposit, and the repayment of a 
eurocurrency deposit. Unlike a domestic deposit, Bank Markhazi Iran's 
or payments between, by, through or to any banking institution to the extent that such transfers 
or payments involve any interests of any foreign country or national thereof ... (B) investigate, 
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit any acquisition, holding 
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation, exportation of, or dealing in 
... any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has an interest; by any person, 
or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
56. Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks and 
National Laws, 64 N.Y.U L. REV. 733, 747 (1989). In 1979, a period of 10 days after the 
hostage incident in Teheran, the president issued an executive order, blocking any official assets 
of Iran subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or which came into the possession of 
persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
57. Id. at 750, citing n. 54: Writ dated 30 Nov. 1979, Bank Markazi Iran, N.A., No. 1979-
B-5903 (Q.B.) (on file at N.Y.U. L. REv.). 
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deposit could not be repaid where the account was held. 
The case never went to trial, thus it is difficult to determine if the 
Court would have redefined the repayment obligation of banks, and held 
that Bank Markhazi Iran had to be repaid in the United States, or whether 
it would have adhered to the traditional approach. Both French and 
English courts denied summary judgement and commissioned groups of 
experts to look into the issues raised and set dates for trial. However, all 
suits were subsequently abandoned when the hostages were released as a 
result of the Algiers Accords of January 19, 1981. 58 The issue of whether 
the Courts will recognize the developing eurobanking reality and modify 
or move away from the well known dictum of Lord Atkin and redefine the 
law on repayment or, on the other hand, adhere to the traditional approach, 
was answered somewhat in Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust 
Co. This case is also important because it also raised other issues 
regarding the adequacy of the common law on the banker customer 
relationship. 
ii.Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. v. Citibank 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Citibank also involved the imposition 
of a freeze, pursuant to an Executive Order59 issued by President Ronald 
Reagan, on the assets of Libya by the United States of America. At the 
time of the freeze, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, was wholly owned by the 
Central Bank of Libya, and had a substantial amount of funds on deposit 
with Bankers Trust Co., a U.S. bank, in London and in New York. 
The relationship between Libyan Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers 
Trust Co. began in July 1972, when Libyan Arab Foreign Bank appointed 
Bankers Trust Co. of New York as its correspondent bank on a reciprocal 
basis.60 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank later opened a eurodollar account with 
58. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
Jan. 18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223 (entered into force Jan. 19, 1981). Under the accords, the Iranian 
assets that stood on the books of the overseas branches of the U.S. banks together with interest 
payments were to be transferred into an escrow account with the Bank of England. This account 
was to be in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. The funds were then to be released to Iran 
upon the safe departure of the hostages. 
59. See Exec. Order No. 12, 544, 51 Fed. Reg., 1235, (Jan. 8, 1986). The Order imposed a 
freeze on all Libyan government owned property in the U.S., or "within the possession or 
control of U.S. persons, including overseas branches of U.S. persons." See also Exec. Order No. 
12, 543, 51 Fed. Reg. 873 (Jan. 7, 1986). There was also another executive order issued by the 
president before this one. Under this first executive order, all imports into the United States of 
goods of Libyan origin and exports of goods to Libya, were prohibited. Also prohibited by this 
first executive order was the provision of credit by U.S. persons to Libya. 
60. Mahvash Alerasool, Extraterritorial Powers: Libya's Frozen Assets and the Question 
of the External Application of the Freeze Order, 18 INT'LCURRENCYREV. 12, 14 (1987). 
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Bankers Trust Co. in Paris that same year. In April 1973, Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank opened a 7-day notice account with Bankers Trust Co. in 
London into which it transferred the balance of the Paris account that it 
had closed.61 In December 1973, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank also closed 
its Bankers Trust Co.-New York Account and transferred the balance to 
its Bankers Trust Co.-London account.62 The eurodollar account that 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank held with Bankers Trust in London was an 
interest bearing account which was used for its day to day operations as 
well as for investment purposes.63 In November 1977, Bankers Trust Co. 
became dissatisfied with the profit earning potential of the London 
account and operating difficulties. Bankers Trust Co. therefore, proposed 
the use of a "managed account system" to manage the affairs of Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank. This was comprised of a current account to be 
maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-New York and a call account to be 
maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-London. 
An agreement was reached in December 1980 under which Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank would open a demand account in New York with a 
minimum balance of$500,000 and a call account in London. The Bankers 
Trust Co. -New York account was to be a non-interest bearing account and 
the daily account operations of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank were shifted to 
New York. Under this managed account system, all transactions were to 
pass through New York. Pursuant to this, Bankers Trust installed a cash 
connector in the Libya office of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank that enabled 
the latter to have direct access to computerized accounts held in Bankers 
Trust Co.-New York. All credit and debit instructions were to be sent via 
this cash connector to Bankers Trust Co.-New York where the 
transactions would be effected. 64 Under the agreement, at 9 a.m. each 
banking day, Bankers Trust Co. was required to determine the closing 
balance for the previous day with respect to the New York account. When 
the balance was in excess of $500,000, the excess was to be transferred to 
the London account. The transfer was to be in such multiples of $100,000 
as would leave a maximum balance of $599,000 in the New York 
account.65 If the balance in the New York account fell below $500,000, it 
was agreed that a compensating transfer was to be made from the London 
account. 
Two days before the imposition of the U.S. freeze order, Bankers 
61. Libya Arab Foreign. Bankv. Bankers Trust Co., 1987 Q.B. 728, 734 (U.K.). 
62. Alerasool, supra note 60, at 15. 
63. Id. 
64. Libyan Arab Foreign. Bank, 1987 Q.B. at 735. 
65. Id. at 737. 
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Trust Co. failed to transfer funds from New York to the London account 
pursuant to the managed account arrangement. At the time of the freeze 
order on January 8th, 1986, the balance in the London account was $131 
million and the balance in the New York account, was $161 million in 
excess of the stipulated $500,000 maximum balance. 
After the freeze was imposed, Libya Arab Foreign Bank made 
various attempts to secure repayment. First, on April 28, 1986, it sent a 
telex to Bankers Trust Co.-London demanding repayment of the balance.66 
A similar telex was also sent to Bankers Trust Co.-New York demanding 
payment of the $161 million that had been frozen in New York. Bankers 
Trust Co., in response, sent a telex refusing both demands for payment. 67 
Libya Arab Foreign Bank therefore, commenced legal action against 
Bankers Trust Co. in the High Court in London claiming, among other 
things: (1) payment of the $131 million from the London account; (2) 
payment of the $161 million from the US account which should have been 
transferred before the freeze; (3) payment of an amount of $1.8 million 
representing the back values of transfers from the New York account to 
the London account which Bankers Trust Co., between April 1984 and 
October 1986, had failed to effect; and ( 4) damages for non-payment of its 
payment instructions. 
Bankers Trust Co., drawing a distinction between the repayment 
obligation in a domestic banking context and in a eurobanking context, 
advanced the argument that Libya Arab Foreign Bank could not demand 
payment in London because it was an express term of the arrangements 
with Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all payments would go through New 
York. Further, the nature of the repayment process of the eurodollar 
transaction required the performance of acts, namely the use of the 
clearing and settlement process in New York. Such acts would be illegal 
pursuant to the freeze order. 
At first instance, Justice Evans observed that the correspondence 
which had taken place between Libya Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers 
66. Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd' s Rep. 259, 268 (Q.B. 
1988). The telex stated, "We hereby instruct you to pay to us at 10:30 am U.K. time on 
Thursday 1st May 1986 out of our U.S. dollar account number 025-13828 at Bankers Trust 
London, the sum of U.S. dollars $131 million. We make demand accordingly. This sum is to be 
paid to us in London at the said time and date, either by negotiable banker's draft in such 
amount (U.S. Dollars 131,000,000.00) drawn on Bankers Trust London, payable in London to 
ourselves (Libyan Arab Foreign Bank) or to our order. Alternatively we would accept payment 
in cash although we would prefer to be provided with a banker's draft as aforesaid." 
67. See Alerasool, supra note 60, at 16. (The telex stated as follows: "We regret we are 
unable to comply because any such transfer and/or payment would be in contravention of the 
January 8th 1986 Presidential freeze covering your funds with us."). 
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Trust Co, in which it had been agreed that all transactions would pass 
through the New York account, was nothing more than an agreement to 
pass transactions through New York. By merely agreeing to pass funds 
through New York, Libya Arab Foreign Bank had not waived its right to 
deal with the London branch. 68 In the eyes of the court, the 1980 
agreement was only concerned with three things: (1) the opening of the 
demand account in New York; (2) the setting up of the managed account 
procedures; and (3) the variation of the notice period for the London 
account. Based on this observation, Justice Evans saw no need to imply a 
term into the contract to the effect that Libya Arab Foreign Bank could no 
longer exercise its rights over the London account. 69 
Justice Evans also held that although the dollar obligations which 
took place in London were settled in the New York clearing system, this 
did not make New York the place of performance of the obligation of 
Bankers Trust Co. This was because the telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign 
Bank had clearly stated that payment was to be made in London, in cash. 
This argument of the court seems to suggest that in the absence of 
any express stipulation in the form of a telex or any other documentation 
which varies a eurocurrency deposit contract, the place of settlement and 
clearing of the currency concerned would be the place of performance. 
The law of that place would then govern the performance of the payment 
obligation. In this respect, the argument of the court appears to make a 
hole in the traditional common law approach regarding the place of 
repayment. The place of repayment is seen as not being absolute, but is 
rather dependent on the facts of the case. Where there is some stipulation 
in the contract that some other place, and not the place where the account 
is kept is the place of repayment, then that stipulation will apply. 
According to the Court, however, since the place of repayment, as stated 
in the telex, was London, the place of ultimate settlement was irrelevant 
and there was no need for the court to make a choice between the 
traditional common law approach and the eurobanking approach. 
Consequently, the court held that the argument of Bankers Trust Co. that 
payment would be illegal had no basis. 70 
On October 16th, 1986, Justice Evans in the high court granted 
summary judgement in favour of Libya Arab Foreign Bank. He stated that 
although his decision might lead to Bankers Trust Co. suffering penalties 
in the U.S., his duty was to enforce the law of the United Kingdom as he 
68. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (order granting summary judgment) in JO MIDDLE 
EAST CURRENCY REVIEW at 48 [hereinafter Summary Judgment]. 
69. Id. at 49. 
70. Summary Judgment, supra note 68, at 50. 
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saw it to be. Bankers Trust Co. appealed the decision on the grounds that 
it should have been given unconditional leave to defend. In view of some 
important observations made by the Court of Appeal it is instructive to 
consider the decision of that court.71 
Justice Kerr in giving the opinion of the Court of Appeal stated that 
the issues to be decided were as follows: (1) whether the London account 
was a eurodollar account and if so (2) what the obligations of the parties 
were with respect to that account. In particular, the court was concerned 
with determining ( 1) if the alleged practice that eurodollar transactions 
were cleared in the United States and made available there, amounted to a 
legally recognized usage and if not (2) whether Libya Arab Foreign Bank 
could demand payment in the manner it had requested. The other issue to 
be determined was (3) the proper law governing the London account. 
The court stated that Bankers Trust Co. could only rely on the 
presidential orders as a defence if either U.S. law was the law governing 
the contractual relationship with regards to the London account or 
compliance with the demand for repayment required some act in New 
York which would be illegal there. 
As the Court of Appeal saw it, the facts of the case revealed strong 
arguable issues that could only be decided at an ordinary trial. As Kerr L.J. 
observed, what Evans J. did in awarding summary judgement was conduct 
a "trial by affidavit" alone. 72 For example, on the issue of whether the 
London account was a eurodollar account and if so what the obligations of 
the parties were, the Court of Appeal held that Mr Justice Evans had based 
his decision on the premise that a bank account is located solely at the 
branch where it is kept. These made Evans J. conclude that Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank could only make a demand for payment and in particular, 
payment in cash at that branch.73 For Kerr L.J., however, the rule that a 
bank account is payable at the branch, probably only applied to bank 
accounts denominated in local currency, and not large amounts of foreign 
currency.74 Kerr L.J., therefore, considered the possibility that the 
common law place of repayment rule, while being applicable to accounts 
denominated in the currency of the jurisdiction where the bank is located, 
was inapplicable to foreign currency deposits. 
Mustill L.J. also observed that it was very possible that the 
eurocurrency market had developed special customs and practices which 
71. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, reprinted in 10 MIDDLE E. CURRENCY REV. at 39 
[hereinafter Court of Appeal Decision]. 
72. Court of Appeal Decision, supra note 71, at 40. 
73. Id. at 38. 
74. Id. 
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made eurocurrency accounts different from ordinary accounts and which 
the court had to recognize. However, since this could only be decided after 
a full trial, the defendant, Bankers Trust Co., was allowed to appeal and 
given unconditional leave to defend the case. On remand the case came 
before Justice Staughton of the commercial court. 
The argument advanced by Libya Arab Foreign Bank on remand 
varied only slightly from that advanced earlier. The most important of 
these claims, which is also the focus of this section, was the first claim for 
$131 million in the account in London. At the basis of this claim was the 
general issue of the nature of the London account-whether it could be 
called a eurodollar account-and rights and obligations of the parties with 
respect to that account. 
This first claim of Libya Arab Foreign Bank for the $131 million in 
the London account was based on four basic propositions of the common 
law approach to the ordinary banker-customer relationship. These 
propositions are as follows: (1) the relationship between the banker and 
customer is that of debtor and creditor; (2) the bank is liable to pay the 
money owed the customer, on demand; (3) the customer is entitled to 
demand to be paid in legal tender; and ( 4) the customer has to make the 
demand at the branch where the account is kept. When these propositions 
were applied to the obligations of the parties with respect to the case at 
bar, it meant that (1) Bankers Trust Co. was the debtor of Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank; (2) Bankers Trust Co. had to pay the money it owed Libya 
Arab Foreign Bank on demand, a valid demand had been made by telex; 
(3) Libya Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to be paid in legal tender, hence 
the demand by telex to be paid in cash was valid; and (4) Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank had to make demand at the branch where the account was 
kept, which was London. Libya Arab Foreign Bank consequently argued 
that there was only one contract and it was governed by English law. 
Alternatively, there were two contracts with two proper laws. The contract 
with respect to the New York account was governed by New York law 
and the contract with respect to the London account remained governed by 
English law.75 
The defendants, Bankers Trust Co., argued that the London account 
was a eurodollar account and was therefore subject to rules that were 
different from those applied in the ordinary banker-customer relationship. 
It also argued that after 1980, with the creation of the new account, the 
nature of the relationship changed: a new contract was created. After 1980, 
although there were two accounts in existence-the New York and 
75. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 270 (Q.B. 
1987). 
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London accounts-there was only one contract, and it was governed by 
U.S. law. This was because it had expressly been agreed between Bankers 
Trust Co. and Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all transactions would pass 
through New York. Since Libya Arab Foreign Bank had expressly agreed 
to the management of its accounts from New York, it was neither entitled 
to make a demand for payment in London, nor receive payment there. The 
corollary of this argument was that even if there had been no freeze order, 
it would still have been contrary to the terms of the contract for Libya 
Arab Foreign Bank to demand payment in London. Since the freeze order 
had made it illegal to effect payments in New York, payment, under any 
circumstances, could not be made. 
This argument in defense, therefore, focused not so much on the 
legality, or otherwise, of the extraterritorial application of the freeze order, 
but on the nature of the contractual obligation itself, which it was argued, 
was expressly governed by U.S. law. 
Bankers Trust Co. also argued that apart from the express term of the 
contract, there was also an implied term that the transfer of funds from 
London to New York would be made by way of a U.S. clearing system, to 
the credit of an account with a bank in the U.S. Such a bank or branch of a 
bank would be nominated by Libya Arab Foreign Bank. In other words, 
because of the nature of the usage of the eurodollar market and the course 
of dealing between the parties there was an implied term that in effecting 
transfers from London to New York only CHIPS or Fedwire would be 
employed. 76 
In arriving at a decision, Justice Staughton first considered the issue 
concerning the conflict of laws. Both Bankers Trust Co. and Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank did not dispute the general rule that had to be applied. 
According to the principles governing the choice of law in contracts with 
foreign elements, performance of a contract is excused if ( 1) it has become 
illegal by the proper law of the contract or (2) it necessarily involves doing 
an act that is illegal in the place of performance. 77 The court, as a threshold 
issue, then had to determine the proper law that governed the London 
contract after 1980. 
3. The Problem of the Proper Law 
As discussed above, the place where the account is kept is also the 
place of repayment under the common law. This approach is based on the 
notion that money on deposit is specie and has a particular location or 
76. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 277. 
77. DICEY AND MORRIS: THE CONFLICT OF LA ws 1167 (Lawrence Collins ed., 11th ed., 
Stevens & Sons, London 1987). 
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situs. In the common law, the proper law of the traditional banker 
customer deposit contract is said to be the law of the place where the 
account is kept. This rule is based on the link between the place where the 
account is kept and the place of repayment in the traditional domestic 
context. However, when this rule is applied to the Eurocurrency context 
problems arise. This is because the place where the eurocurrecy deposit 
account is kept is not the usual place of repayment. 
In Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, the Court was of the 
opinion that this traditional rule was applicable to the eurocurrency 
context. Mr. Justice Staughton held that one had to start from the first 
principle that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the contract 
between banker and customer is governed by the law of the place where 
the account is kept. Therefore, the problem was to determine the place 
where the London account was kept. Although he observed that it was 
difficult to apply the analogy of an account being kept at a specific place 
to the case at bar,78 he nevertheless went on to conclude that since the 
actual entries on the London account were made in London, the London 
account was kept in London at all material times. Thus, there were either 
two separate contracts or one contract with two proper laws. Mr. Justice 
Staughton however, preferred the idea of one contract governed in part by 
the law of New York and the law of England.79 But as far as the 
obligations of the parties concerning the London account were concerned, 
Mr. Justice Staughton held that English law governed. 80 
Unlike the observation of Kerr L.J. in the Court of Appeal, Mr. 
Justice Staughton held that it would require overwhelming evidence 
before it could be asserted that the general principles, with respect to the 
choice of law rules in the banker-customer relationship, did not apply to 
the eurocurrency deposit relationship. For Mr. Justice Staughton then, the 
link between the place where the account is kept and the place of 
repayment (which is at the basis of the proper law rule) was applicable to 
the eurocurrency deposit in the case at bar. In other words, the place where 
the account was kept in the eurocurrency deposit operation, London, was 
the same as the place where repayment of the deposit was to take place. 
4. The Form of Payment 
Another issue that arose in the case was the form of payment. As 
explained earlier, since the common law considers money on deposit to be 
specie, unless an agreement to the contrary exists, the depositor is entitled 
78. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 270. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 271. 
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to be repaid in specie. This is problematic in the eurobanking context, 
because the bank where the account is kept does not have access to specie, 
and the account is in the form of book entries only. The court in Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers' Trust, went on to consider the kind of 
payment that Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to demand, which 
would not necessarily involve an illegal act in the U.S. 
The primary line of defence of Bankers Trust Co. was that there was 
an express term in the contract after 1980 that mandated that payment be 
effected via New York. If there were such an express term, Libyan Arab 
Foreign Bank would not be entitled to demand payment in London and 
payment would have to pass through New York. In this event, payment 
would also be illegal. However, Mr. Justice Staughton held that the 
managed account arrangement, together with its express term, had been 
terminated by the telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign Bank demanding 
payment. After this termination, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was within its 
rights to demand payment in London. Having resolved the issue of 
whether there was an express term concerning payment in New York, it 
was then necessary to determine if there was an implied term as advanced 
by Bankers Trust Co. The essence of Bankers Trust Co.'s defense based 
on the implied term, was that payment of eurodollars necessarily involved 
a clearing system in the U.S. This procedure-according to Bankers Trust 
Co.-was an integral part of the operation of eurocurrency deposits and 
was based on the fact that the dollars, which were the subject matter of the 
contract, were not available in England. Consequently, it would be 
impossible to effect payment in legal tender in London. Unlike a sterling 
deposit and deposits of small quantities of foreign currency, Bankers Trust 
Co. had no direct access to wholesale deposits of eurodollars, which were 
nothing more than book entries. This also meant that the parties could not 
have envisaged cash as a means of payment. In support of this position, 
Bankers Trust Co. submitted in evidence the written expert report of Dr. 
Marcia Stigum. The report of Dr. Marcia Stigum stated, among other 
things, that cash transactions are an insignificant part of the eurocurrency 
market and that the market is strictly a non-cash market.81 Mr. Justice 
Staughton, after considering the evidence, observed that Bankers Trust Co. 
had failed to establish the existence of a usage in the market as well as a 
course of dealing between Libyan Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers Trust 
Co., which would justify implying a term that payment had to be made in 
New York, via the New York payments and clearing system. He 
nevertheless made it clear that it was possible that such a usage could be 
81. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 278 (quoting the 
expert report of Dr Marcia Stigwn). 
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established as regards time deposits that were traded between the dealing 
rooms of banks. This was not so with the case at bar. 
Having rejected the existence of such a usage, the Court held that 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to payment in legal tender or cash 
(either dollars or sterling).82 It was the opinion of Mr. Justice Staughton 
that apart from the problem of security and counting, there was no 
formidable difficulty in Bankers Trust Co. obtaining the equivalent of 
$131 million in sterling notes from the Bank of England. Bankers Trust 
Co. obtaining dollar bills would also pose no problems, and, in the view of 
the Court, the delivery of dollars from New York would not constitute 
performance per se, but merely preparation for performance. 83 
Thus, in this major decision by a court, involving the deposit side of 
the eurocurrency market, the common law rules regarding the banker-
customer relationship were considered applicable to eurocurrency deposits 
without any modification or reformulation. 
The decision leaves many unanswered questions. The Court argued 
that there was no implied or express term in the deposit agreement, that 
required payment to be effected in New York. In particular, the Court did 
not consider the method and place of repaying large dollar deposits that 
would constitute a usage. This implied that repayment of the eurocurrency 
deposit in the case at bar had to take place in London, although the bank 
did not have access to such large amounts of foreign currency. Indeed, the 
Court did not consider it relevant to give any consideration to the nature of 
the clearing system. The conclusion that may be derived from this case is 
that since, according to common law principles, a depositor of local 
currency has a right to demand repayment in cash a customer depositing 
foreign currency also has a right to be repaid in cash (irrespective of the 
quantity involved) in addition to other forms of payment. 84 
82. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank Banker's Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 281. 
83. Anne Joyce, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust: Common Law Meets Its 
Limits?, 29 HARV. lNT'LL.J. 451, 461 (1988). 
84. See Ross Cranston, The Libyan Assets Case: Limits to Extraterritorial Claims, 3 J. 
INT'L BANKING L. 177, 180 ( 1987) (in discussing other forms of repayment, Staughton drew a 
distinction between the correspondent transfer and the complex dollar account transfer. He 
argued that in a complex dollar transfer, a transfer in London would be reflected in the 
transformation of accounts held at the Federal Reserve or a correspondent account. Although 
this form of transfer involved an act in the U.S., it did not mean that payment was effected 
there). See also Hal Scott, Where Are the Dollars? - Offshore Funds Transfers, 3 BANKING 
& FIN. L. REV. 243-46 (1988-1989) (also agrees that payment of eurodollar deposits do not 
necessarily take place in the United States, but his reasons for this assertion are different. 
According to Professor Scott it is possible for payment of a eurodollar deposit to be effected by 
'in-house' and correspondent bank transfers so that the payment system of the U.S. will not be 
involved). 
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Justice Staughton' s observations reveal that the traditional proper law 
rule concerning deposit contracts may not be directly applicable to 
eurocurrency deposits. The observation that in some cases it may be 
possible to establish the existence of a usage concerning the repayment of 
eurocurrencies via the country of issue, suggests that the traditional 
approach may be modified. This is because since the proper law rule is 
based on the common law link between the place where the account is 
kept and the place of repayment, in those situations where the place of 
repayment is different from the place where the account entries are made, 
the basis for the rule collapses. 
It is submitted, on the basis of the above analysis, that there is the 
need for a re-evaluation of the common law regarding the payment 
obligation of banks. The common law must take into consideration the 
modem reality. In this day and age of eurocurrency deposits and 
placement operations where an account is opened without the deposit or 
transfer of actual specie, the prevailing practice suggests the existence of 
an implied term that payment is made not where the account is maintained 
but in the country of issue of the currency concerned. Regretfully, the 
court in Libyan Arab Foreign, Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. 85 missed a good 
opportunity to rethink the archaic common law approach to the banker 
customer relationship. For the court to say that in the absence of a 
statement to the contrary, a depositor of foreign currency of whatever 
amount has a right to demand payment in cash, because "every monetary 
obligation is to be fulfilled by the delivery of cash," is not in accordance 
with the reality. 86 
5. The Funds Transfer RelationshipBbetween Eurobank and 
Customer 
The second stage in the relationship between the eurobank and the 
customer arises when the customer gives the eurobank a mandate to effect 
a transfer of funds. In the search for legal rules to govern funds transfers, 
courts in the past have relied on analogies from the common law rules 
regarding the collection and payment of cheques and other bills of 
exchange. One of these analogies concerns the law of agency as it applies 
to the collection and payment of bills of exchange. 
In the ordinary common law banker customer relationship, it is 
generally accepted, that although the general character of the banker-
customer relationship is that of a contract, this legal character is modified 
85. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 259. 
86. Id. at 281. 
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and becomes one of agenc~ when the bank undertakes certain transactions 
on behalf of its customer. 7 When the bank obtains a mandate from the 
customer to effect a transfer of funds from one ordinary account to 
another, the contractual relationship is modified and becomes one of 
agency. The reason is that in both credit and debit transfers, 88 as in the 
case of collecting negotiable instruments and effecting payment via the 
cheque clearing process, the bank is acting in a representative capacity on 
the instructions of its customer.89 The customer is the principal in this 
agency relationship and the bank transferring the funds, the transmitting or 
originating bank, is the agent. 
While it is generally accepted that the above common law principles 
also apply in the eurobaking context, courts have drawn a distinction 
between on the one hand, the process of transferring funds, which gives 
rise to a relationship of agency, and on the other, the instruction to transfer 
funds from the customer which does not give rise to any legal relationship. 
This distinction was drawn in Royal Products v. Midland Bank.90 
In Royal Products, the Plaintiff, was a company that carried out its 
operations in Malta, and maintained bank accounts with Midland Bank in 
England, and National Bank and Bank of Industry Commerce and 
Agriculture (BICAL) both located in Malta. In November 1972, Royal 
Products wanted to transfer funds from its account with Midland Bank in 
England to National Bank in Malta. If the transfer was affected directly, 
Royal Products would have had to pay certain high fees. Royal Products 
thus, decided not to transfer the funds to National Bank, but rather to 
transfer the funds to BICAL and it instructed Midland Bank to transfer the 
87. See London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur, [1918] A.C. 777; Austrlia 
& New Zealand Bank Ltd. v. Ateliers De Constructions Electriques De Charleroi, [1967] 1 
A.C. 86; Hapgood, supra note 44, at 407-35; Ogilvie, supra note 43, at 557. 
88. A credit transfer is an order or instruction from the customer to its bank to transfer 
funds from the customer's account to the account of the payee, maintained either with the same 
bank or another bank. A credit transfer therefore, has the effect of pushing funds from the 
account of the payor-customer sending the payment order, to the beneficiary. A debit transfer, 
on the other hand, seeks to draw funds from one account into another account. Examples of 
debit transfers include ( 1) a direct debiting arrangement where the payee's bank is instructed by 
the payee-customer to obtain payments due to the payee from the payor's bank and (2) the use 
ofa check. 
89. See Richard King, The Receiving Bank's Role in Credit Transfer Transactions, 45 
Moo. L. REV. 369 (1982); D.I. BAKER & R.E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS 
TRANSFERS chs. 29-11 (Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, 2nd ed. 1988); LORD CHORLEY & J. 
MILNES HOLDEN, LAW OF BANKING 266 (Sweet & Maxwell 1974); E.P. Ellinger, The Giro 
System and Electronic Funds Transfers, 2 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 178, 195 (1986) 
(arguing that funds transfers are composed of a string of transactions in which the banks 
involved act in representative capacities). 
90. See Royal Products v. Midland Bank, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (Q.B. 1980). 
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funds to BICAL. Midland Bank, which had a correspondent relationship 
with National Bank in Malta, had on previous occasions arranged such a 
transfer directly with BICAL. However, on this occasion Midland Bank 
decided to affect the transfer through its correspondent relationship with 
National Bank. Midland thus instructed National Bank to transfer the 
requested funds from its vostro account to the account of Royal Products 
at BICAL. This instruction was given by telex. National Bank only 
became aware of the telex the following day, November 24. On that day, 
instead of immediately affecting the transfer, National Bank opened an 
internal suspense account in the name ofBICAL and credited this account. 
The funds were transferred later. The following day BICAL ceased 
operations and the Central Bank of Malta took over its operations. 
On November 27, upon determining that BICAL had ceased 
operating, Royal Products asked Midland Bank to amend the funds 
transfer instruction and not to transfer funds to BICAL but to National 
Bank. Following these instructions, Midland Bank instructed National 
Bank to retrieve the original remittance. National Bank advised Midland 
Bank that the transfer had already been affected on November 25 and that 
it could not be retrieved because BICAL was now under the control of the 
Central Bank of Malta, which had imposed restrictions on BICAL's 
operations. Midland Bank informed Royal Products of the situation and 
Royal Products commenced an action in England against Midland Bank. 
Royal Products argued that: ( 1) they were entitled to be reimbursed 
their money because their instructions were never carried out; (2) Midland 
Bank owed it a duty in carrying out the funds transfer instructions and 
were in breach of this duty; and (3) National Bank, the third party, and 
Royal Products had a contractual relationship, and National Bank should 
have effected the transfer on the date that it received the order. 
In determining whether Royal Products could recover its funds, the 
Court made certain statements respecting the legal character of the funds 
transfer order and the nature of the legal relationship that arises when a 
funds transfer order is given. According to the Court, a funds transfer 
order is nothing more than a mere instruction from the customer to the 
bank to affect a transfer. While the process of affecting the transfer could 
give rise to a legal relationship, such as an agency relationship, the transfer 
order itself did not give rise to any relationship between Royal Products 
and Midland Bank. 
The Court held further, that Midland owed a duty to use care in 
carrying out the transfer and could be held to be vicariously liable for the 
conduct of its agents. However, the funds transfer instruction did not 
create any additional obligation on Midland Bank. The instruction merely 
required that Midland Bank affect a transfer, it did not preclude it from 
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employing a specific method of transfer. Finally, the court also held that 
there was nothing in the instructions to affect the transfer that created 
privity of contract between Royal Products and the subagent, National 
Bank. 
The decision exposes an inconsistency between, the traditional 
common law approach as laid down by Atkin L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss 
Bank, including the relationship between a bank and its customer in the 
domestic context, versus, the relationship in the eurobanking context. In 
the domestic context banks are frequently required by clients to undertake 
certain activities, including crediting the account of other customers at the 
same bank or at other banks. The decision in Joachimson v. Swiss Bank 
makes it clear that the relationship between a bank and its customer is 
contractual. As part of the contract there is an obligation on the customer 
to "exercise reasonable care in executing written orders so as not to 
mislead the bank." The reason for this is that the written order or 
instruction binds the bank and it must act on the written order. The 
decision in Royal Products suggests, however, that when the customer 
gives a bank an instruction, for example, to credit the account of another 
customer, that instruction does not give rise to any legal relationship 
between the bank and the customer. In the eurobanking context then, a 
distinction is drawn between the funds transfer instruction, and the process 
of effecting the transfer. If there is any legal relationship, it arises only at 
the time that the eurobank proceeds to effect the transfer and not before. 
Conceptually, it is difficult to see how one is able to sever the 
instruction of the customer from the totality of the contractual relationship 
that underpins the banker customer relationship, so that one is able to 
make the argument that the instruction of a customer to its bank, gives rise 
to no legal relationship. The decision clearly creates a need for clarity in 
the common law on the banker customer relationship. 
i. Duties of the Originating Bank as an Agent 
The relationship of agency in the credit transfer process imposes 
certain duties on the transmitting/originating bank. One of the most 
important duties that the transmitting bank owes to the customer is a duty 
to exercise care and skill in the process of transferring the funds. It is 
generally accepted that the standard that is imposed on the transmitting 
bank is the standard which is expected of a bank engaged in that business, 
according to current banking standards. This duty of care and skill may be 
divided into three facets: ( 1) the transferring bank must act in accordance 
with the mandate of its customer; (2) the transferring bank is obliged to 
employ the services of a reliable correspondent bank to effect the transfer 
where this is needed; and (3) the transferring bank must effect a timely 
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transfer of the funds concemed.91 This duty of care and skill is owed only 
to the sending customer and not to a stranger, or the payee.92 The only 
time where an originating or paying bank will owe a duty to a payee is 
where the paying bank is also a receiving bank. In this context, the bank 
owes a duty in its capacity as a receiving bank. However, the case of 
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd.93 suggests that a paying or 
originating bank may owe a duty to a payee not only because it is also a 
receiving bank, but also because it assumed or took upon itself the 
responsibility of effecting the transfer on behalf of the payee. The case 
stands for the proposition that if a party assumes the responsibility of 
performing a task on behalf of another, then that party is liable in the event 
that its act or omissions result in damage to the other party. 
6. The Duty to Act in Accordance with the Customer's Mandate 
Under the law of agency, an agent is required to comply strictly with 
the instructions of its principal. This has been determined to mean that 
where the agent exceeds its authority or does not follow the mandate of its 
principal to the letter, the agent will not receive any reimbursement.94 This 
is so even if the result of exceeding or going contrary to the principal' s 
instructions is not detrimental to the principal. The corollary of this rule is 
that the principal' s instructions, in this case the customer's instructions to 
the transferring bank, have to be unambiguous and clear. It has been held 
in some cases that where the mandate of the principal is ambiguous, the 
agent may use the ambiguity to justify its construction of the 
instructions. 95 
In the context of funds transfers, the originating or transmitting bank 
is under a duty to act in accordance with the customer's mandate. Failing 
to act in accordance with the customer's mandate is the general expression 
that encompasses a variety of situations in which the transferring bank 
91. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson, 27 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 49 (H.L. 1926) (In the 
absence of a contractual disclaimer, the originating bank is held to be vicariously liable for the 
negligence or default of its correspondents). 
92. This is especially relevant in those situations where the originating bank accepts a 
transfer order from a stranger, pursuant to an arrangement between the beneficiary bank and the 
originating bank that is intended to benefit the beneficiary or payee. The possibility of a stranger 
using a bank to affect a credit transfer to a payee at another bank is very likely in England 
where, after the Golden Memorandum of 1967, a person is able to effect payments into the 
account of another from any bank in the U .K. under the Giro system. 
93. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 761 (1994); see also White v. 
Jones, 2 W.L.R. 187 (1995). 
94. See Midland Bank v. Seymour, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 147, 168 (Q.B. 1955). 
95. See Ireland v. Livingston, [1872] 5 L.R. 395 (H.L.); see also European Asian Bank 
v. Punjab & Sind Bank, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 611, 617 (1983). 
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effects an incorrect transfer. This includes effecting a transfer to the wrong 
payee or beneficiary, including the situation where no transfer is 
authorized, and effecting a transfer to the correct payee, but in the wrong 
amount. 
The current position seems to be that the rule regarding strict 
compliance by an agent with the instructions of its principal is modified in 
the funds transfer context. In Royal Products v. Midland Bank,96 it was 
held that a transferring bank will not be held to be in breach of its mandate 
if, in following the instructions, it acts in accordance with the skill and 
manner generally accepted in the business of banking. 97 
i. The duty to engage a reliable correspondent bank 
According to the law of agency, an agent may neither delegate its 
authority nor appoint a sub-agent to undertake any transaction on behalf of 
the principal, without the express or implied authority of the principal.98 
Then, prima facie, the transmitting (originating) bank, without the 
authority of the customer, may not engage any other bank to assist it in 
effecting the transfer. This general rule poses problems in those situations 
where the beneficiary-payee of a funds transfer order maintains an account 
at another bank with which the transmitting (originating) bank does not 
have a correspondent account. Where a beneficiary-payee of a funds 
transfer order maintains an account at either ( 1) a bank with which the 
transmitting (originating) bank has a correspondent relationship, or (2) 
another branch of the transmitting (originating) bank, then a direct transfer 
is possible. However, in those situations where neither of the above 
account arrangements exists, there is the need for an intermediary bank. 
The position seems to be that where there is the need to employ the 
services of a correspondent sub-agent, the transmitting (originating) bank 
will be deemed to have the implied authority of it's customer-principal to 
appoint the correspondent bank as its sub-agent for the purposes of 
affecting the transfer.99 This is so for two reasons. First, the nature of the 
transaction is such that it cannot be carried out without the appointment of 
a sub-agent. This being so, it is possible to argue that the customer-
principal intended that the transmitting (originating) bank should be able 
to delegate its authority. 100 Also, the employment of a sub-agent to assist 
96. See Royal Products v. Midland Bank, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (Q.B. 1980). 
97. Id. at 194, 199. 
98. De Bussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286 (1878). 
99. Quebec & Richmond Railway v. Quinn, 14 E.L.R. 899 (1858); see also Equitable 
Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd., 25 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 90 (1926). 
100. De Bussche, 8 Ch. D. 286 (1878). 
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the transmitting (originating) bank in effecting the transfer of funds is 
justified by the customs and usage of the eurocurrency market. 
IV. THE RELATION SHIP BETWEEN THE TRANSMITTING ORIGIN A TING BANK 
AND THE CORRESPONDENT BANK 
Since the correspondent bank acts on the instructions of the 
transmitting (originating) bank, it is the agent of that bank. The rules 
discussed above, regarding the duties of skill and care of an agent, are also 
applicable here. The correspondent bank is under a duty to act in 
accordance with the mandate that is given to it by its principal, the 
transmitting (originating) bank, and to use such skill and care as would be 
expected of a comparable bank in such a situation. 
A. The Relationship Between the Payor/Sending Customer and the 
Correspondent Bank 
Regarding the relationship between the customer who initiates the 
funds transfer, and the intermediary correspondent bank, the general rule 
is that delegation does not create privity of contract between the principal 
and the sub-agent. Thus, so far as the issue of rights and liabilities is 
concerned, the payor (the principal) may only sue and be sued by the 
transferring-originating bank (the agent). Likewise, the sub-agent, the 
correspondent bank, may only sue and be sued by the agent-transmitting 
(originating) bank. 101 
This situation, where the transmitting (originating) bank delegates its 
authority to another intermediary bank because the nature of the 
transaction warrants it, needs to be differentiated from those situations 
where ( 1) a customer may employ a bank specifically for the purposes of 
creating an agency relationship between it and a third party, and (2) the 
agent undertakes to provide the customer with another agent as a substitute 
for itself. In these two situations, the customer's bank, in reality becomes 
functus officio when the third party is appointed an agent. In general then, 
whether privity of contract exists between the customer who initiates the 
funds transfer and the intermediary bank which is employed by the 
customer's bank to effect the transfer, will depend on the circumstances of 
the case and the intention of the customer (the principal). There are two 
U.S. cases which illustrate this exception to the general rule regarding 
privity, namely, Silverstein v. Chartered Bank, 102 and Evra Corp. v. Swiss 
101. Calico Printers Asso 'n v. Barclays Bank, 145 L.T. 51 (1931); Schmaling v. Tonlinson, 
6 Taunt 147 (1815). 
102. Silverstein v. Chartered Bank H.K., 392 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1977). 
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Bank. 103 
In Silverstein, the U.S. court was of the opinion that there was privity 
of contract between the payor-customer and the bank's correspondent 
because the correspondent had been expressly requested by the customer. 
Evra Corp., involved an Illinois corporation, Evra Corp., that was 
engaged in shipping and the purchase and sale scrap metal. Evra Corp. 
entered into a charter under which it was required to pay approximately 
$1,825 per day as rent. The ship was to be used by Evra Corp. to deliver 
scrap metal to fulfil a prior contract with a Brazilian corporation. The 
charter provided that if Evra Corp. failed to make payment on time, the 
owner could withdraw the vessel. Payment was to be made by wire 
transfer through an Illinois bank, the Continental Illinois National Bank. 
Continental, to the Swiss account of the owners at Banque de Paris et des 
Pays-Bas (Suisse). To affect this transfer, Continental Illinois National 
Bank used Swiss Bank as its correspondent bank. For one payment, 
following a request from Evra Corp., Continental Illinois Bank sent a 
funds transfer order to its London branch for transmittal to Swiss Bank in 
Geneva. A telex operator at the London branch of Continental Illinois 
National Bank tried to reach Swiss Bank's general telex to provide it with 
the funds transfer instructions but did not succeed. The telex operator then 
sent another message to another telex number at Swiss Bank and received 
a confirmation that the message had been received. Unbeknownst to the 
telex operator, there was no paper in the telex machine to which the 
message had been sent, although the machine continued to receive 
messages. Consequently, Swiss Bank did not act on the funds transfer 
message and the funds were not paid into the account of the ship owners at 
the required time. The owners withdrew the Charter and Evra Corp. sued 
Swiss Bank alleging that Swiss Bank had breached its contract with it. 
Swiss Bank in defence argued that it owed no duty to Evra Corp. as it was 
a merely a correspondent bank and an agent of Continental Illinois 
National Bank. The Court held that Swiss Bank was liable to pay damages 
for breach of contract and negligence and that there was privity of contract 
between Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank. Although the decision was 
overturned, the decision on appeal turned on the issue of consequential 
damages. The dictum of the lower court with respect to privity between 
Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank was not discussed on appeal. 
Thus, if the circumstances of a case suggest that the customer's bank 
was authorized to find a bank that would affect a transfer, as opposed to 
effecting the transfer itself with the aid of an intermediary bank, there will 
103. Evra C01p. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (1981); rev'd 673 F.2d 951 (1982). 
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be privity of contract between the customer and the intermediary bank 
which is employed by the customer's bank. However, if the customer 
initiating the funds transfer authorized the bank to affect a transfer, and the 
bank employed the services of a correspondent bank to do so, the 
exception to the rule regarding privity will not apply. However, since most 
eurocurrency transactions are effected by the means of correspondent 
banks that are employed by other banks to effect transfers, the general 
common law rule, which leans against finding privity of contract, will 
apply. 
It is possible to argue that the above cases have not really altered the 
general rule with regard to privity of contract because they were decided 
on peculiar facts. For instance, it is possible to argue that in Silverstein, by 
expressly requesting a correspondent bank, the customer had impliedly 
requested its bank to create an agency relationship between it and the 
correspondent bank. In other words, by expressly selecting the 
correspondent bank, the transferor had taken away from its bank one of 
the attributes that would have made it a principal: the ability to choose and 
employ an agent. 
Although the decision in Evra Corp. is more difficult to justify, it is 
possible to argue that the U.S. District Court found privity of contract 
because of its reliance on Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
Court held that under the common law of the U.S., there was privity of 
contract between a principal and its sub-agent. 
It is possible to argue on the basis of the current state of the law, that 
as a general rule, the correspondent will not be held liable for breach of 
contract vis-a-vis the initiating customer if it is shown that: (1) the 
transferring bank was authorized to effect the transfer and not to create an 
agency relationship between the correspondent bank and its customer; (2) 
the transferring bank engaged the correspondent bank, on its own initiative 
to assist it in effecting the transfer; and (3) the transferring bank has not 
undertaken to provide the customer with another agent as a substitute to 
itself. 
B. Can the Correspondent Bank be Liable in Tort? 
Although it is generally accepted that the transferring bank will be 
held liable for the negligence or default of its agent, the liability of the 
correspondent bank in tort to the initiating customer is not at all certain. It 
has been argued, on the basis of an analogy with the law of bailment, that 
a correspondent bank can be held liable in tort to the customer of a 
transferring bank. 
According to this approach, in the law of bailment, if "X" bails goods 
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to "Y," who then makes a bailment of the goods to "Z," "Z" will be held 
liable for the loss or destruction of the goods. 104 However, it is not at all 
clear if this principle in the law of bailment can be applied to the law of 
agency. In Balgamo v. Medeci, an attempt to apply the approach to the law 
of agency failed. 105 Justice Walton, in addition to holding that the principal 
could not sue the sub-agent in contract because there was no privity, also 
held that because there was no duty owed by the sub-agent to the 
principal, no action could be maintained in tort. Consequently, the only 
right of action was in contract against the agent. This case may not be as 
decisive a determinant of the issue as it seems for various reasons. First, 
the reason why the principal could not sue the sub-agent in tort appears to 
have been procedural. The sub-agent was not named and served as a third 
party. Also it seems too broad a statement to state that no duty of care 
arises between the correspondent bank, which is a sub-agent, and the 
customer who initiates the transfer. The argument may be made that the 
customer is a person who the correspondent bank should foresee as likely 
to be affected by its acts and omissions if it does not exercise due care. 
Thus, a duty of care arises in this sense. 
It has also been argued that correspondent bank is too remote a 
potential tortfeasor to be sued in tort. However, this argument is without 
any foundation in law. The issue of proximity in tort law is with regard to 
the injured party and not the tortfeasor. It is definitely certain, that a 
customer is a party who is reasonably foreseeable by the correspondent 
bank. Consequently, an action in negligence may be brought against it. 
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RECEIVING/DESTINATION BANK AND 
THE BENEFICIARY-CUSTOMER 
The existing case law suggests that when a receiving/beneficiary 
bank receives funds on behalf of its customer, the payee or beneficiary, it 
does so as an agent of such a customer. In The Laconia, Denning M.R. 
states, "[T]he paying bank is the agent of its own customer to make the 
payment, [and] the receiving bank is an agent of its customer to receive 
it."106 However, although the argument that an agency relationship 
existing between the sending-customer and the transferring bank can be 
justified on the basis of the principles of the common law, it is difficult to 
104. See Lee Cooper Ltd. v. CH Jenkins & Sons Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 753 (Q.B. 1965); Learoyd 
Bros. & Co. v. Pope & Sons Ltd., [1968] 1 All E.R. 811; James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Hay's 
Transport Services Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535 (Q.B. 1972). 
105. Balsamo v. Medici, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 951 (Ch. D. 1984). 
106. Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd., v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia, [1976] Q.B. 
835 (C.A. 1986) [hereinafter The Laconia]. 
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justify the agency argument when it comes to the relationship between the 
receiving/destination bank and the payee or beneficiary. 
There are various reasons for this. First, the agency argument goes 
against the very basis of the law regarding the banker-customer deposit 
relationship. Cases such as Foley v. Hill and Joachimson v. Swiss Bank 
Corp. have laid down the often quoted principle that when a depositor 
places money in a bank account, the money so deposited constitutes a loan 
to the bank. 107 The bank becomes the borrower and as such it can use the 
funds as it sees fit. The relationship is not one of bailment. If this is the 
basis of the banker-customer deposit relationship, then when a bank 
receives money on behalf of its customer, it does not do so as an agent for 
its customer, but in its own right as a borrower. 
As well, when a bank transfers funds into a nominated bank account, 
the transfer discharges any debt that the payor owed to the payee. The 
receiving bank then becomes the new debtor or takes the place of the 
original payor in respect of the sum that is owed to the payee. To argue 
then that the receiving bank is an agent of the payee, is to say that contrary 
to the basic principles of the banker-customer relationship, the payee and 
not the bank owns the funds deposited. 
Another reason why the argument that the receiving bank is an agent 
to receive funds transferred to the payee is incorrect is that, such an 
argument is incapable of explaining the point in time when the receiving 
bank ceases to be an agent and becomes the owner of the funds which 
have been deposited into the account of the payee. 
The better approach, it is submitted, is that when the receiving bank 
receives funds on behalf of its customer, unless there are circumstances 
which indicate a different kind of result, such a receiving bank receives the 
funds, not as an agent of the customer-payee, but in its own right as a 
borrower and consequently, an owner of the funds. This argument finds 
support in Midland Bank v. Conway. 108 In that case Mr. Justice Sachs held 
that although a bank received rent on behalf of its customer, who was a 
landlord, it did not do so as an agent for the customer. Rather, in receiving 
the rent, it did so in its capacity as a banker, by virtue of the relationship of 
banker and customer. 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSMITTING BANKS AND FUNDS 
TRANSFER NETWORKS 
The above discussion shows that the interbank transfer of funds is 
107. Joachimson, [1921] 3 K.B. 110, (Eng. C.A. 1921); Foley, 2 H.L. Cas. 28 (1848). 
108. Midland Bank, Ltd. v. Conway Borough Council, 1 W.L.R. 1165 (Q.B. 1965). 
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essentially the interbank transfer of financial information. This 
information results in the alteration of information possessed by the 
concerned banks. The transmission of such financial information is made 
possible by the use of electronic funds transfer mechanisms, which are 
employed by network organizations. It will be recalled that these network 
organizations fall into two categories, namely, (1) those networks which 
are concerned with the transfer of financial information alone, and (2) 
those networks, which, in addition to being transferors of financial 
information, are also clearing and settlement systems. 
What the existence of network organizations means is that instead of 
a bank sending a message directly to another bank; it sends it to the 
network which then transmits it to the receiving bank. As between the 
banks and the network organizations, the relationship is primarily 
contractual and is concerned with the actual communication of the 
financial information and messages, that is, the transfer and delivery of the 
information or message. The terms of the contract, which will usually be 
contained in the user handbook of the particular network organization, 
will, in most cases, govern aspects of the bank-network relationship such 
as, ( 1) the correct format to be used for the conveyance of the message or 
financial information; (2) security for messages and the prevention of 
fraud; (3) confidentiality of messages; (4) procedures to be followed to 
obtain redress in the event of network failure or malfunction; and,( 5) the 
extent to which the network organization guarantees the accurate 
transmission of messages. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion has revealed clear differences between the 
common law on the banker-customer relationship and the evolving law on 
the eurobanker-customer relationship. As this article has shown, what one 
can describe as the traditional common law on the banker-customer 
relationship, as laid down in cases such as Joachimson v. Swiss Bank, is 
based on the notion that money is cash or specie, and a deposit of money 
in a bank is a deposit of cash or specie. This notion influences the common 
law approach with respect to other aspects of the banker-customer 
relationship. For example, the law with respect the place of repayment of a 
deposit, and the law with respect to the proper law of the deposit. As this 
article has shown, applying the traditional common law approach to the 
relationship between a eurobank and its customer gives rise to problems 
for several reasons: (1) deposits of eurocurrency are not deposits of specie 
or physical cash, but book entries; (2) the transaction straddles a number 
of jurisdictions; and (3) the place where the book entries representing the 
deposit are made, is not necessarily the place where the deposit is repaid. 
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These differences do not augur well for consistency and certainty in the 
law. There is thus the need for the courts to infuse some clarity into the 
law. 
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